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Abstract
The Air Force, since adopting and subsequently developing the Total Force
concept in the early 1970s, has not thoroughly outlined clear objectives by which the
progress toward and realization of this strategic vision should be defined and measured.
Without clear definition, direction, and method of evaluation, the ability to credibly claim
any subsequent successes or failures in the pursuit of this vision become vulnerable to
challenge. Indeed, the mere claim that a single, clear vision exists may be challenged.
The Total Force concept’s degree of success has, on multiple occasions through
its history, been critiqued with the most recent instance occurring with the National
Commission on the Structure of the Air Force’s report, delivered to the President and
Congress, specifying 42 recommended improvements. The relatively brief history of the
Total Force concept has led to a gap in knowledge with respect to this topic. While the
SecAF and CSAF have employed language implicitly claiming successful integration of
the Total Force and all the stated benefits thereof, these benefits as well as the key
success factors for attaining them at the tactical level have yet to be quantified.
Therefore, through the semi-structured interviewing of tactical level Total Force
leaders, this research provides an assessment of the “perceived” local Total Force
Association health, highlights strategic and tactical level communication and perception
disconnects with regards to the Total Force concept, and provides the Headquarters Air
Force Total Force Continuum office an actionable listing of tactical level obstacles and
concerns as well as a collection of best practices and innovative solutions.
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AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE INDICATORS OF A SUCCESSFUL TOTAL
FORCE ASSOCIATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Background
The Air Force (AF), since adopting and subsequently developing the Total Force concept
(TFC), has not thoroughly outlined clear objectives by which the progress toward and realization
of this strategic vision should be defined and measured. Without clear definition, direction, and
method of evaluation, the ability to credibly claim any subsequent successes or failures in the
pursuit of this vision become vulnerable to challenge. Indeed, the mere claim that a single, clear
vision exists may be challenged.
Regarding the Total Force and the TFC, the language and wording choices of the AF’s
most senior leaders is of interest to follow. These senior leaders, the Secretary of the Air Force
(SecAF) and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), annually report and deliver statements
to the Senate’s Committee on Armed Services. These USAF Posture Statements, as they are
commonly referred, cover a spectrum of topics; but have, since 2005, included strategic intent
with respect to the Total Force (USAF Posture Statement, 2005). The significant point of interest
in following the wording of these statements is the apparent movement of these most senior AF
leaders from an introduction and explanation of what it means to be “Total Force” (i.e. what
organizations/components comprise this coined phrase); to a recommendation for integration of
the Total Force components; to a push for continued integration; and finally, to an implicit
assumption of successful integration (i.e. association).
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Some might argue such a verbal progression is, indeed, natural and healthy development
of a strategic vision over time. Arguably, to lead an organization such as the AF into a new way
of doing business, given its size and scope of responsibility, requires a patient, persistent pushing
of a consistent agenda. Such perspectives might even complement the Unity of Effort displayed
by the AF’s senior leaders from 2005 to the present, given the fact that the United States has seen
multiple persons respectively fill the chairs of both SecAF and CSAF.
Yet, proclamations of healthy development of a strategic vision can only be claimed if
the language choice or strategic intent of the AF’s senior leaders is substantiated by measured
progress of the organization toward the defined goal. Put simply, if the walk does not reflect the
talk, then discussions of “progress”, “development”, and “change” are meaningless. Contrarily, if
over time, reality does not reflect the stated assertions; then, unfortunately, those words lose their
meanings and very possibly undermine the credibility of those same senior leaders.
This negative effect presents an opportunity for thoughtful consideration since the degree
of success of the TFC has, on multiple occasions throughout its history, been critiqued. As one of
the most recent examples, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force (NCSAF)
established by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014, Section
362 was charged to “undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Air Force and to
determine whether, and how, the Air Force structure should be modified to best fulfill current
and anticipated mission requirements in a manner consistent with available resources” (DAF,
2015). In January 2014 the NCSAF delivered to the President and Congress a report specifying
42 separate, recommended actions promoting an integrated Total Air Force and a focus of
improving the TFC from its current state.
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The relatively brief history of the TFC has led to a gap in knowledge with respect to this
topic. Despite the fact that “the uniformed members of today’s Total Force consist of
approximately 327,600 Regular Air Force Airmen [RegAF], 105,400 Air National Guard [ANG]
Airmen, and 70,400 Air Force Reserve [AFR] Airmen actively serving in the Selected Reserve”
(USAF Posture Statement, 2014) and that many have been both directly and indirectly affected
by this strategic vision, little has been written evaluating the shared perspectives of strategic and
tactical leaders concerning the acquired benefits and challenges associated with its
implementation. This prefacing context leads to the stated problem at hand.

Problem Statement
The SecAF and CSAF have employed language implicitly claiming successful integration
of the Total Force and all the stated benefits thereof. However, these benefits as well as the key
success factors to attain them at the tactical level have yet to be quantified.

Research Purpose
This research will attempt to highlight disconnects in communication and perception by
comparing and contrasting the statements of the Air Force’s most strategic leaders to the
statements, opinions, and perspectives of tactical Total Force leaders.

Research Question
What success factors allow tactical level Total Force leaders to share a common objective
and means of evaluating the Total Force Active Association?

13

Understanding Total Force
Before delving into the relationships linking the component members of the Total Force
and subsequently the specific research focus, a benefit exists to understanding what personnel
categories make up the component members which in turn collectively represent the Total Force.
Total Force is not a concept strictly consigned for AF use. To the contrary, all branches
of the military employ some form of the TFC. However for the purposes of this research, the
discussion of the contextual literature has been narrowed to include only those sources pertinent
to the AF’s development on the subject. That said, Total Force as defined by AF Doctrine
“consists of the people who make up the Air Force” including RegAF or Active Duty (AD)
members, ANG members, AFR personnel, United States Air Force (USAF) military retired
members, USAF civilian personnel (including foreign national direct and indirect-hire, as well as
non-appropriated fund employees), contractor staff, host-nation support personnel, and the Civil
Air Patrol as the official Air Force Auxiliary (The Total Force, 2015).
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This Total Force listing, being quite extensive, is depicted below through the usage of an
organizational chart in the following Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Components of the Total Force (DoD, 1990)

Figure 1 gives the full spectrum of personnel categories which collectively represent the
Total Force. Within the “Research Focus” section of this chapter an explanation is given for
further winnowing down the Total Force to an examination of the two overarching components
of Active Forces and the Reserve Forces highlighted, along with their pertinent subcategories, in
blue. The blue and purple arrows, pointing to the distinct Active and Reserve Forces’ category
columns, provide the common use acronyms of RegAF or AD Component and Air Reserve
Component (ARC) respectively.
15

Total Force Associations (TFAs)
Per the newly published Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-1001, Planning Total Force
Associations, the AF formally partners Active and Reserve component organizations through Total
Force Associations (TFAs) in which “two or more USAF component organizations agree to share
resources to perform a common mission” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). These TFAs are CSAF-approved
operational constructs with the purpose of organizing, training, and equipping USAF forces.
There are, as also defined by AFI 90-1001, two Total Force Association types:
•

Classic Associations in which a RegAF Sponsor organization shares a mission with
one or more ARC Associate organizations

•

Active Associations in which an ARC Sponsor organization shares a mission with one
or more RegAF Associate organizations

Research Focus
An evaluation of all AF TFAs since the earliest Reserve Associate example in 1968 would,
doubtless, bear fruit; however, this research scopes its focus to those instances with Active
Associate organizations. In Active Associations “the sponsor organization [i.e. the ARC] is the
organization with primary responsibility for mission accomplishment and normally assigned the
preponderance of the primary physical resources (e.g. aircraft, weapon system equipment, weapon
system support, and production facilities)” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). At the same time, “the associate
organization [i.e. the AD Component] shares the primary physical resources assigned to the
sponsor organization, and may provide additional physical resources necessary to support the
shared mission” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). Some confusion may stem from the fact that associate and
sponsor organizations will “vary from full or tailored wings to groups, squadrons, and detachments
16

depending on the scope of the shared mission” (AFI 90-1001, 2017). It is important to note,
however, that the TFA “sponsor organization status does not imply ownership of an installation”
(AFI 90-1001, 2017).
Furthermore, TFAs not being limited to one organizational career field, this research
scopes the focus to those Active Associations comprised of aircraft maintenance organizations.
Finally as previously stated and demonstrated, since the Total Force consists of such a
diverse spectrum of personnel categories, the specific TFAs and aircraft maintenance
organizations of interest for this study are those solely comprised of AD personnel supplementing
either partner AFR or ANG components (i.e. the ARC).

17

Total Force Active Association Example
In an effort to make this information more tangible, the following Figure 2 gives a real
world example of a Total Force Active Association.

Figure 2 – Total Force Active Association

This example depicts two separate Wings and there subordinate Groups (i.e. the 15th
comprised of AD members and the 154th comprised of ANG members) partnering to conduct the
single mission of flying and maintaining a fleet of F-22 aircraft. Since, in this case, the aircraft
maintenance TFA is an Active Association the AD component functions as the “Associate”
sending personnel (depicted by the blue arrow) to comprise 20 percent of the F-22 maintenance
effort. The ANG component functioning as the “Sponsor” is the organization with primary
responsibility for mission accomplishment; and is, therefore, assigned the preponderance of the
primary physical resources (i.e. aircraft, weapon system support, and production facilities) and
administers 80 percent of the manpower (depicted by the purple arrow) for the F-22 maintenance
effort.

18

Investigative Questions
The following investigative questions seek to comprehensively flesh out and provide the
means for answering the overarching research question as it pertains to the stated problem:
•

IQ 1: What, collectively, do leaders understand the TFC to mean at the tactical level?

•

IQ 2: On which topics, respecting employment of the TFC, do tactical level Total Force
leaders collectively perceive similar benefits as those lauded by the AF’s most strategic
leaders?

•

IQ 3: What unforeseen, symptomatic problems (with discernable root causes) do tactical
level Total Force leaders perceive employment of the TFC introducing?

•

IQ 4: Regarding the listed root causes, do tactical level Total Force leaders believe
decision making and subsequent solution generating to be more appropriately handled by
higher organizational levels?

•

IQ 5: In what ways do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive a lack of adequate
training, resources, and/or guidance to address Total Force concerns?

•

IQ 6: From whom or what entity do tactical level Total Force leaders seek Total Force
specific guidance?

•

IQ 7: What is the collective wisdom from tactical level Total Force leaders for sustaining
and/or improving employment of the TFC?

Methodology
Data Collection Method
To thoroughly assess the tactical Total Force leader perspectives, a qualitative approach
must be applied to multiple topics which fall under their purview. The qualitative data gathering
19

method employed in this research is the Interview process. Much of the information regarding
Total Force benefits and challenges resides in those personnel who currently have or formerly have
had hands-on experience within associated organizations. Thus, the target population of the study
will include Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) currently serving within TFAs as well as possibly
having prior TFA experience. Interviews, conducted in person, would, of course, be the preferred
data collection approach, but due to the limitations of both time and cost, the interviews were
conducted in a semi-structured, impersonal manner via telephone conference calls. By using the
interview method with its direct, focused nature of communication, the researcher had the ability
to capitalize on such strengths as the opportunities for feedback, for additional probing of complex
answers, and for garnering high subject participation (i.e. 94 percent).
Data Analysis Method
The collection of the data from the subjects was accomplished through the digital recording
of the interviews of all responses as well as note taking during each interview. Once collected, the
responses were then transcribed and coded to afford the opportunity for trend and theme analysis.
The discerned themes and trends were assessed with respect to their bearing on the study’s
previously listed investigative questions and research question.

Assumptions/Limitations
Although most certainly beneficial to study the implementation benefits and challenges of all
the AF’s currently existing 112 TFAs (see Appendix A), this research was limited to nine (see
Appendix B) of the total 25 Active Associations. An assumption then of this research is that the
research results are transferable to the other 11 Active Associations as well as the 22 Classic
Associations directly conducting aircraft maintenance. The constriction to nine TFAs is a
20

limitation, as previously stated, largely to the time and resource constraints associated with the
study. The bottom line assumption, therefore, is that this research has direct and indirect
implications for 42 of the 53 (i.e. 79 percent) aircraft maintenance TFAs (see Appendix C).

Implications
Three related implications emerge at the outset of this research. The first implication is that
the interviews provide an assessment of the tactical level’s “perceived” local TFA health.
Secondly, this research highlights strategic and tactical level communication and perception
disconnects with regards to the TFC. Finally, this research provides the Headquarters Air Force
(HAF) Total Force Continuum office an actionable listing of tactical level obstacles and concerns
as well as a collection of tactical level best practices and innovative solutions.
In this way, the research better equips the Total Force community both up and down the
chain of command with a clearer understanding of how the strategic vision for the Total Force
concept is being realized and/or hindered while promoting greater transparency of the common
stress points and success factors.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the literature highlighting the development of
the Department of Defense (DoD) and more particularly the Air Force’s Total Force “concept to
policy” over the course of the past 44 years as well as the push for association of some of the
major component members: Active Duty (AD), Air Force Reserve (AFR), and Air National
Guard (ANG).

Description
History of the Total Force Concept (TFC)
In 1970, with the end of the draft and the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force, Secretary
of Defense (SecDef) Melvin Laird introduced and the DoD adopted the “Total Force Concept”
(Buchalter & Elan, 2007). This initiative came on the heels of and is arguably linked to
Congressional cuts in defense spending at the time. (RAND, 1993) A full nine years after the
TFC’s introduction the Comptroller General, a position appointed by the President of the United
States (POTUS) responsible for the fiscal activities of the United States government, reported to
Congress regarding the status of the Total Force in, DoD “Total Force Management” – Fact or
Rhetoric?. Within this report the Comptroller General observed developing implementation
disparities between the services, called for standardized guidance, and requested a means of
measuring Total Force benefits. At the time, he stated the “present total force policy is vague and
incomplete […] the services have developed independent policies and management systems with
different manpower and cost elements. […] The [DoD] should issue comprehensive guidance for
a uniform total force policy and for effectively measuring its benefits” (Staats, 1979). The
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impetus driving such statements and calls for action stemmed from a “Congressional interest in
reducing military costs without sacrificing readiness” (Staats, 1979). This stated balance of a
desire for reducing costs without sacrificing readiness sets the stage for the next 30 years of Total
Force Management discussion and efforts.
Origin of the Total Force Policy (TFP)
Three years after the introduction of the TFC, new SecDef, James Schlesinger, heralded
the TFP. He declared that “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It is now the Total Force Policy
which integrates the active, Guard, and Reserve forces into a homogeneous whole” (Correll,
2011). Of particular interest, despite the SecDef’s sentiment, was the discarding of the TFP draft
the same year as its inception rendering his statement “essentially an expression of support rather
than a change of substance” (RAND, 1993), (Correll, 2011).
The discarding of the TFP serves as a significant point to note because future senior
leaders heavily reference the policy as if it has lasted the tests of time. In 2002 SecDef Rumsfeld
references the TFP stating that it is “hampering his ability to deploy forces” and suggesting he
would seek changes (Jones, 2004). Yet, if the concept never legally matured from concept to
codified policy except in “expression of support rather than change in substance”, then, for 30
years, the progression of this topic/strategy is grounded on a subjectively sentimental foundation.
Much overarching wartime strategy depends on the TFP’s effectiveness. A solely sentimental
foundation jeopardizes the success of this wartime strategy.
In more recent years, the progression of language from the references by senior leaders
becomes easier to note as they quickly evolve and build upon one another. First, in 2005 comes a
strategic level introduction:
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•

“We have developed a long-range plan to allocate resources, balance risks, and shape
the force to protect our nation – a comprehensive Future Total Force (FTF)” (USAF
Posture Statement, 2005).

While not truly a new concept as this statement implies, having its origins reaching back
to the early 1970s, this introduction quickly shifts to an emphasis for greater use with the CSAF
directing Major Command (MAJCOM) “commanders to provide plans […] for more closely
integrating [ARC] assets into active duty units and operations” (Buchalter & Elan, 2007). As the
years progress and with the publication of an Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 90-10 outlining
command policy, this language emphasizing greater degrees of employment continues:
•

“We will continue transforming to meet the challenges of a dynamic world by
rebalancing the force and realigning our structure into a Total Force that meets
increased demands for persistent intelligence, rapid mobility and precision strike
capabilities” (USAF Posture Statement, 2006).

•

“Your Air Force today is a seamless Total Force […] We will continue […]
rebalancing […] and realigning our structure into a Total Force that meets increased
demands for persistent intelligence, rapid mobility and precision strike capabilities”
(USAF Posture Statement, 2007).

As the senior leaders’ strategic vision progresses, certain key terms simultaneously
transform. For example, “Future Total Force”, introduced as new terminology in the previous
2005 senior leader quote, is discarded in favor of “Total Force” and the strategic level begins
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heavily using the term “integration”. In fact, in 2007 HAF publishes AFI 90-1001 outlining and
directing the Responsibilities for Total Force Integration (TFI). (AFI 90-1001, 2017)
By 2008, the emphasis of increased employment persists with the subtle language shift
now giving validation and continued support of current Total Force integrative efforts:
•

“A distinguishing hallmark of the Air Force is the ease with which Total Force
Airmen work seamlessly together at home and abroad” (USAF Posture Statement,
2008).

The next progression in the language occurs when the push and validation of “seamless
integration” shifts to the recognition and promotion of greater interdependence between the Total
Force contributing members:
•

“We are one Air Force […] There is great interdependence between Active, Guard,
and Reserve forces. […] It is essential that we manage the health of the Total Force
holistically, and we are committed, now more than ever, to strengthen our integration
of effort” (USAF Posture Statement, 2013).

•

“The Air Force has made great strides in understanding how a three-component
structure can operate as a powerful, efficient, and cost-effective Service that
maximizes the integrated power of our air, space, and cyberspace forces. This needs
to be the way we do business, without even thinking about it” (USAF Posture
Statement, 2014).
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By 2014 and accompanying this recognition and promotion language, HAF introduces
new terminology such as “Total Force Integration Association (TFIA)” with the publishing of
the interim Air Force Guidance Memorandum (AFGM) to AFI 90-1001 (AFI 90-1001 AFGM
2014-01, 2014). While Total Force Integration (TFI) still remains in relevant usage this addition
to the jargon does foreshadow future changes.
The strategic language, ultimately, recognizes the progression of the concept to the way
of doing business and promotes the strategy’s continued vector:
•

“Put simply, our goal is to render obsolete the need for the term ‘Total Force’ – but
maintain its premise. This can only be considered a success when the lines have
blurred sufficiently to optimize Active, Guard, and Reserve contributions (both
uniformed and civilian) to the Air Force mission, while recognizing and leveraging
their unique characteristics.” (America's Air Force: A Call to the Future, 2014)

•

“We must further blur the lines between the components where appropriate, while
retaining their strengths. In addition to current associate unit models, we must identify
additional opportunities for integration between Active and Reserve Components”
(USAF Strategic Master Plan, 2015).

With the 2016 publication of the updated but still interim guidance to AFI 90-1001, HAF
mostly discontinues its use of the apparently transitional term, TFIA, in favor of the now more
familiar Total Force Association (TFA) (AFI 90-1001 AFGM 2016-01, 2016). One year later
and possibly in response to the #12 recommendation for policy revisions from the NCSAF
report, the final altering of terms takes place with the most recent publication of AFI 90-1001
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(DAF, 2015). HAF officially defines the formerly described TFIs as TFAs retitling, in fact, AFI
90-1001 to the current Planning Total Force Associations (TFAs) and ridding the Total Force
community completely of such in-between language as Total Force Integration Association
(TFIA) (AFI 90-1001, 2017). Any future progression of the term TFI, though, whether to
transform again or simply disappear, remains indeterminate.
At some unknown point during the course of this timeline, the previously stated 2006
AFPD 90-10 which outlined and directed command policy for Total Force Integration is
removed from the AF electronic Publishing Site. This website more commonly known as “AF ePubs” serves as the central repository for all AF Publications currently in effect. This recall or
removal of a publication directing Total Force Integration activity, shares remarkable similarity
to the fate enjoyed by SecDef Schlesinger’s TFP some 30 years previous (i.e. the TFP draft was
discarded the same year as its inception). Simply put, both instances are similar in that the
strategic level drafts policy directing tactical level action followed by senior leaders claiming
developmental progress of the Total Force concept only to, then, later discard that same directive
policy. The historical observer is left asking, “What drives such behavior?”
Air Force Policy Memorandum (AFPM) 90-10, a document which is temporary in nature,
is published in 2016 giving an overview of the now removed AFPD 90-10 outlining TFI
governance. Yet this memorandum merely points to an AFPD that “will be codified” in “the first
instance of a to-be published Air Force publication [emphasis added]” (AFPM 90-10, 2016). In
other words, over the years, current TFIs have assumed and now bear the name, TFA, with its
implied development of status. And while this development garners the support from the
strategic leaders’ language, the codified guidance for how TFIs should be conducted has yet to
be written. It appears as if the senior leaders are waiting for the tactical leaders to figure out how
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to conduct Total Force Integration/Association efforts before they write the policy directing
those efforts. Put simply, the tail appears to be wagging the dog.

Total Force Strategic Level Guidance and Management
DoD Strategic Level Total Force Oversight
Pivoting to discuss oversight and management of the Total Force, two counselor lanes
exist to advise the SecDef: one speaking to Total Force issues and the other to Total Force
mixture. The principal advisors to the SecDef for the first lane of counsel (i.e. Total Force issues)
are the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (DoD, 1990).
The second lane of counsel (i.e. Total Force mixture) comes from “the Chairman of the
Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) [who] serves as advisor to the SecDef on existing and projected
military threats and the mix of the Total Force needed to meet the threat” (DoD, 1990). This task
is neither simple nor easy. In fact, a number of very dynamic and fluid concepts emerge steering
“choices about the size of the Total Force and the mix of active and reserve forces [depending]
on the nature of current and potential threats to the nation, the military capabilities required to
meet those threats, the ability of different types of forces to accomplish their wartime missions,
the availability of defense resources, and the willingness to accept the greater or lesser risks
associated with various levels of defense spending” (DoD, 1990)(Total Force Policy Study,
1990).
The CJCS, therefore, “provides strategic direction to the armed forces and develops
operational plans” (DoD, 1990). The CJCS must strategize with the entire DoD in mind and not
just a single service such as the AF. The AF fits into the strategic picture of Total Force
28

management by developing “its programs on the basis of top-down guidance. National military
objectives established by the President, the Defense Planning Guidance, the DoD Total Force
Policy, and fiscal constraints provide the framework for force development” (DoD, 1990).
The consideration given to “fiscal constraints” later becomes a focal point of discussion
for this research since “the criteria are used to provide the most cost-effective force to meet
stated warfighting levels [with key] considerations [including] availability, supportability, and
mission capabilities” (DoD, 1990). As previously stated, “there is great interdependence between
Active, Guard, and Reserve forces.” Given this interdependence and fiscal consideration, it
affords little wonder, when coupled with the oversight framework, that the CSAF and SecAF
warn of the importance of “[ensuring] the right balance between [Total Force members]” (USAF
Posture Statement, 2013). They specifically state that
“too much force structure in the Active component does not capitalize on
potential lower operational costs of personnel and installations in the Reserve
component. Too little force structure in the Active component requires
Guardsmen and Reservists to deploy more often—even in peacetime—which
breaks the model of a part-time force, threatens the sustainability of the Total
Force, and increases costs significantly” (USAF Posture Statement, 2013).
This warning then raises the question as to how, over the course of time, the AF chooses
to manage this development of the Total Force.
USAF Strategic Level Total Force Oversight
The CSAF in 2006 directed the formation of the Total Force Integration Directorate an
agency “responsible for future force structure, emerging-mission beddown and development of
Total Force organizational constructs. Working with [the] partners in the Air National Guard and
Air Force Reserve, the Air Force [maximizes] overall Joint combat capability” (USAF Posture
Statement, 2006).
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In 2013 strategic AF leaders charter a new entity known as the Total Force Task Force.
This entity, representing a “team led by three two-star general officers from the Regular Air
Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve”, assumed the task of “leading a
reassessment of the Air Force’s efforts to develop the appropriate Active and Reserve component
balance through processes that enable the Department of the Air Force to leverage the inherent
strengths, unique aspects, and characteristics of each component” (USAF Posture Statement,
2013). The “Total Force Task Force, [charged with] conducting a comprehensive review of
Total Force requirements and [developing] strategic options to ensure that the Air Force balances
the strengths of each component while sustaining necessary capabilities in the years ahead”,
served as “a focal point for the [Congressionally directed NCSAF review]” (USAF Posture
Statement, 2013).
The temporary nature of the Total Force Task Force was later realized when repurposed
in 2014 as the current Total Force Continuum, an office located in the Pentagon, with the defined
role “to explore and leverage the unique strengths and characteristics of each component”
(USAF Posture Statement, 2014). The Total Force Task Force, despite the short-lived extent of
their oversight had “conducted a comprehensive review of Total Force requirements, offered
ideas for improving collaboration between the three components, and gave [strategic leadership]
a starting point for future Total Force analysis and assessment efforts” (USAF Posture Statement,
2014). The Total Force Continuum continues “the body of work initiated by the Total Force
Task Force [by] continuing to develop and refine decision support tools that will help shape and
inform the [future] budget deliberations” (USAF Posture Statement, 2014).
Overall, the Total Force Continuum focuses on two primary lines of effort: Balance and
One Air Force. Balance is tasked to develop strategic Force Mix Options that ensure Total Force
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capabilities meet future requirements. One Air Force is tasked to identify legal, policy,
operational, and organizational changes to enhance the Total Force integration to include
management and oversight of the TFAs. This role mimics the previously described two
counselor lanes which advise the SecDef on Total Force issues and Total Force mixture.
Thus, while the changes in their names and the adjustments to their purposes follow the
same pattern as the previously discussed Total Force terminology, clearly agencies have and do
exist at the strategic level to conduct Total Force oversight.

Total Force Concept Stated Benefits
Stepping away from the discussions of Total Force origin and oversight, the prevailing
question which persists throughout this literary journey is, “Why employ a Total Force model?”
Previous allusions to fiscal consideration, readiness, and the like are sprinkled throughout the
above discussion, but this question demands direct addressing and attention.
In the most basic and strategic terms, the Total Force concept presents the SecDef with a
risk versus reward decision. Stated plainly, since 1980 (and arguably earlier), while “reducing
the size of the active forces, […] DoD has steadily increased the size of its reserves and the
number of missions assigned them [in] an attempt to hold down defense costs” (GAO, 1989).
Yet, collecting these costs savings comes with the risk of decreasing “military effectiveness”
(GAO, 1989).
If, in its simplest form, this risk versus reward balance reflects the true choice set before
the SecDef, then the answer for “why employ a Total Force model” is logically decided by
properly identifying and choosing the path in which benefits outweigh costs. The discussion then
becomes one of identifying the benefits of employing the Total Force model. Senior AF leaders
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describe these benefits in terms of Synergistic Effects which are “the proper application of a
coordinated force across multiple domains [producing] effects that exceed the contributions of
forces employed individually” (Synergistic Effects, 2015). They state that partnering Total Force
organizations claim these Synergistic Effects through a Unity of Effort defined as “coordination
and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of
the same command or organization” (JP 1-0 Joint Personnel Support, 2016).
The following list comprehensively provides the Synergistic Effects gained through the
employment of the Total Force concept as lauded by the AF’s most senior leaders:
•

Improved and Streamlined Training (USAF Posture Statement, 2006)

•

Increased Capacity (USAF Posture Statement, 2008)

•

Increased Retention (USAF Posture Statement, 2008), (USAF Posture Statement,
2013)

•

Enhanced Readiness (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)

•

Improved Efficiency (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement,
2008), (USAF Posture Statement, 2011), (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)

•

Improved Flexibility (DoD, 1990), (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture
Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2008)

•

Decreased Mobilization (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture Statement,
2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement, 2008)

•

Increased Cost Savings (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement,
2013)

•

Improved and Streamlined Resource Usage (USAF Posture Statement, 2007)
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•

Increased Personnel Stability (USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture
Statement, 2007)

•

Increased Military Capability (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF Posture
Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture Statement,
2008), (USAF Posture Statement, 2011); (USAF Posture Statement, 2013), (DAF,
2014)

•

Reduced Duplication of Efforts (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)

•

Improved Balance of Experience (DoD, 1990), (USAF Posture Statement, 2005),
(USAF Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture
Statement, 2013)

•

Improved Leadership Development (USAF Posture Statement, 2006)

•

Improved Operational Effectiveness (USAF Posture Statement, 2005), (USAF
Posture Statement, 2006), (USAF Posture Statement, 2007), (USAF Posture
Statement, 2008), (USAF Posture Statement, 2011), (USAF Posture Statement, 2013)

One may critique the arbitrary nature of these findings and their lack of context. Yet, as
mentioned in the previous chapter, multiple independent studies over the years have taken on this
challenge of measuring the effectiveness of the Total Force with differing approaches and
ultimately critiquing the AF’s level of success. This approach merely presents the most senior
AF leaders’ quoted benefits of employing the Total Force concept.
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Total Force Complexities
Total Force Component Legal Distinctions
Having in the previous chapter defined the component members of the Total Force and
specified the categories of interest, a general understanding of the legal distinctions within these
two categories (i.e. Active Forces and Reserve Forces) is now warranted. Another useful mode
of viewing these personnel categories is through the lens of their manpower percentages. Figure
3 depicts a percentage makeup of the previously discussed Total Force personnel categories.
Readers should keep in mind that these numbers continually change and do not present exact,
current day figures but a “ballpark” sense of the proportional sizes.

Figure 3 – Composition of the Total Force (DoD, 1990)

As identified by the blue and purple arrows, Active Forces and Reserve Forces are the
personnel categories or Total Force components (i.e. AD and ARC) of interest for this research.
Of note from Figure 3 is that, while the overall Total Force percentage mixture (discussed in the
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previous DoD Strategic Level Total Force Oversight section) of the Active Forces and Reserve
Forces is non-static, the research narrowed Total Force components represent the two largest
manpower contributors. In other words, the AD component and ARC are relatively big
organizations.
Another important concept depicted in Figure 3 are the distinctions between United
States Code (USC) Titles 10 and 32:
•

Title 10, USC refers to the Federal Mission to staff, equip, and train flying and
support units that augment the AF to conduct training in support of Total Force
requirements, perform peacetime missions compatible with training requirements,
maintain mobilization readiness, and support contingency and wartime taskings.

•

Title 32, USC refers to the State Mission to provide trained and equipped units to
protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety as
directed by the governor.

Active Forces are defined “as the component of the Air Force that consists of persons
whose continuous service on active duty in both peace and war is contemplated by law” (The
Total Force, 2015). Simply put, an AD member serves in the military full time under Title 10,
USC.
Reserve Forces consists of both AFR and ANG members. The AFR “a component of the
[AF] as prescribed by law. They are represented by a mix of [personnel categories]” (The Total
Force, 2015). The ANG is an “organized state militia and a reserve component of the Air Force”
(The Total Force, 2015). However, the ANG is also “a federal organization [as] a reserve
35

component of the [AF]. [ANG] Airmen serve in both organizations, and can move between [the
State and Federal Missions] as duty requires” (The Total Force, 2015).
Depending on the circumstances and setting, either Title 10 or Title 32, USC can govern
the Reserve Forces. In other words, depending on the situation, an ARC member can have a
chain of command that extends to either the governor of the state or the POTUS. These chains of
command are legally distinct; and, thus, introduces variability and status consideration
complexities. In a hierarchical and dynamic setting, members and/or leaders find themselves
asking “who is in charge?”
The means of navigating these legally driven, status complexities take the form of
Operational Direction (OPDIR) and Administrative Control (ADCON):
•

OPDIR “describes the authority of a member of one component to designate
objectives, assign tasks, and provide direction to members of another component
necessary to accomplish steady-state duties other than operational missions and
ensure unity of effort” (AFI 90-1001, 2017).

•

ADCON refers to “direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other
organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of
Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit
logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization,
discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the
subordinate or other organizations.” (AFI 90-1001 AFGM 2016-01, 2016).
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Of note, OPDIR authority should not be confused with Operational Control (OPCON)
“authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing
and employing commands and forces, assigning task, designating objectives, and giving
authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission” (Air Force Glossary, 2015). OPDIR,
rather, “enables functional supervisors from any component to direct personnel from another
component detailed under their supervision, and does not apply in the context of military
operations under the command and control of a Combatant Commander” (AFI 90-1001, 2017).
Simply put, OPCON grants a more comprehensive scope of authority of which OPDIR is a part.
In a TFA setting, “sponsor and associate organizations retain [ADCON] of their own
forces separate organizational structures to include Unit Manning Documents (UMDs) and
chains of command. ANG organizations [still] must respond to requests from the governor of
their state/territory and must fulfill those tasks consistent with provisions of public law” (AFI 901001, 2017).
Total Force Cultural Comparison
As previously stated, the AD component and ARC are relatively large organizations with,
in some cases, independent missions, legal distinctions, and fiscal distinctions. With this
observation in mind, it is little wonder that they develop cultural distinctions as well. These
cultural distinctions further add intricacy to an already complex environment. Reflecting, on the
necessity of Total Force leaders to be aware of the status (i.e. Title 10 or 32) of all personnel
under their control and the requirement (due to ADCON distinctions) that they coordinate with
partnering component leaders for exercise of certain types of authority (e.g. discipline over
subordinates), one can appreciate how additional, relational tensions might generate between
component members due to cultural differences.
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In the below Figure 4, a number of areas are identified in which the cultures of the AD
and the ANG prove disparate:

Figure 4 – Cultural Comparison (Lamothe, 2015)

The above Figure 4 does not necessarily present an exhaustive listing of the cultural
distinctions. Yet, coupling these additional complexities with those of the legal, monetary, and
governing distinctions sets the stage for discussing the possible obstacles hindering the
progression of the Total Force concept.

Force Field Theory
In light of the preceding historical and contextual revelations, Force Field Theory serves
as a useful lens for discussing the current state of the Total Force concept and setting the stage
for analyzing its progression.
Force Field Theory contends that an issue is held in balance by the interaction of two
opposing sets of forces – those seeking to promote change (i.e. Driving Forces) and those
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attempting to maintain the status quo (i.e. Restraining Forces) (Lewin, 2015). The following
Figure 5 presents a pictorial demonstration of this theoretical claim:

Figure 5 – Force Field Analysis (Lewin, 2015)

The above Figure 5 depicts a center field representing the Present or Desired State. In
this paper’s discussion the Desired State refers to promotion and successful realization of the
AF’s senior leaders’ vision for the Total Force concept. Exerting from the left side of this field
are positive Driving Forces for change. Resisting from the right side of the field are Restraining
Forces as obstacles to change. The preceding sections of this chapter have, at length, produced
examples of Restraining Forces. One force, not yet directly discussed, though, can, without
proper guidance, transform from a Driving Force to a Restraining Force.
This changeable force, the tactical level leader, serves in a “rubber meets the road”
capacity for employing the vision of the Total Force concept. These agents are the frontline
drivers for implementing change. The AF’s strategic leaders call for these frontline agents to
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move with the previously defined Unity of Effort. The senior leaders contend, that to do
otherwise sacrifices the beneficial Synergistic Effects of employing the Total Force concept.
The net result of movement without Unity of Effort is tactical level leaders pitting their
energies and efforts against one another. These tactical leaders may fully agree and support the
success of the Total Force concept yet only differ in their ideas of how to employ it. Having a
clear understanding, therefore, of the Desired State as well as the strength and/or means to
overcome the obstacles resisting these tactical leaders’ efforts is essential for securing a
successful transition. This research, in the subsequent chapters, examines those very leaders in
order to determine which side of the Field they, regardless of intentions, exert the greatest Force.
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III. METHODOLOGY

Chapter Overview
This chapter introduces and defines the methodology whereby data, pertinent to the
problem statement, are collected and analyzed for their significance. Since the overall approach
is qualitative in nature, the specific, chosen method of data collection was impersonal, semistructured interviews. Semi-structured interviews served as the best means of discussing the
problem statement as guided by the framework of the outlined research and investigative
questions. The pool of interview participants was, out of practical necessity, limited to a couple,
key individuals holding certain unique positions, authority, and perspectives at each of the
respective TFAs under scrutiny.

Materials and Equipment
Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, very little equipment is required to
collect the data. Interview subject responses are documented through two forms: digital, audio
recording and manual note taking. A digital recording device serves as the primary medium for
acquiring bulk data. Note taking by the researcher serves as the secondary and supplemental
form of capturing nuances of meaning within responses or circumstantial anomalies. In addition
to the digital, audio recording device and software used to transcribe the collected audio files,
Microsoft’s Word® and Excel® are used to segment, code, and analyze the bulk data. No further
specialized equipment is required to accomplish the data collection and analysis.
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Process and Procedures
Target Population
As foreshadowed in Chapter 1, this research studies Total Force partnerships in which the
primary contributors are AD members partnered with members from the ANG or AFR.
Additionally, the data collection focuses, specifically, on those Air Force bases (AFBs) with
Total Force Active Associations in which AFR or ANG members direct the local operation and
AD members supplement with manpower and perspective. Twenty-five Total Force Associations
of Chapter 1’s aforementioned 112 AF TFAs (see Appendix A) fit this description.
These 25 TFAs were further filtered to the final listing of nine TFAs (see Appendix B) at
nine bases using a standardized, repeatable logic. First, only those Total Force Active
Associations in which the partnering units conducted aircraft maintenance of various Mission
Design Series (MDS) are included. A TFA with a Red Horse civil engineering mission would be
an example of a TFA that is not a part of the research focus and, therefore, excluded. Second,
aircraft maintenance of unique airframes such as E-8s and C-40s were not included. Third, only
TFAs which had already moved from planning through initiation were considered. Finally, due
to certain practical limitations tied to the study, only those Total Force Active Associations
hosted at Air Force or Air Reserve Bases (ARBs) were included. Despite these stated bounds to
the research scope, the study still achieved topic saturation.
The final selected nine TFAs at their respective nine bases form the focal point of this
study and are listed below:
•

Barksdale AFB, Louisiana ; MDS: B-52

•

Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona ; MDS: A-10

•

Homestead ARB, Florida ; MDS: F-16
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•

Joint Base Pearl Harbor – Hickam, Hawaii ; MDS: F-22

•

March Joint ARB, California ; MDS: KC-135

•

Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth , Texas ; MDS: F-16

•

Scott AFB, Illinois ; MDS: KC-135

•

Seymour-Johnson AFB, North Carolina ; MDS: KC-135

•

Whiteman AFB, Missouri ; MDS: A-10

The following Figure 6 depicts the geographic location of each of these bases while
highlighting the diverse range of base ownership and structure. Those bases represented by blue
stars are AFBs while those represented by purple stars are ARBs.

Figure 6 – Research Narrowed Total Force Active Associations

It is important to note from the above Figure 6 the convergence and overlap of multiple
layers of authority. These nine TFAs reflect the vested interests of not only multiple partnering
units, but also partnering MAJCOMs (with their subordinate Numbered Air Forces), and
partnering military services along both Federal and (multiple) State lines. In other words,
looking to JB Pearl Harbor – Hickam, Hawaii as an example, the aircraft maintenance Total
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Force Active Association must answer to and/or work with/through, at least, three distinct higher
level agencies: the National Guard Bureau, the USAF, and the US Navy. Each of these agencies
have different pots of money and different processes they follow. The complexity of partnerships
is further demonstrated in the following Figure 7 with five MAJCOMs, five AFBs, three ARBs,
and two Joint bases listed with multiple instances of categories overlapping. Additionally
significant, but not listed in Figure 7, is the fact that six of these selected TFAs are examples
where parallel TFA aircraft maintenance operations are conducted. In other words, at six of the
geographic locations a combination of Classic and Active Associations for aircraft maintenance
simultaneously exist.
Base Name

MAJCOM
S ponsor

Homestead Air Reserve Base
AFRC
Seymour Johnson Air Force Base
AFRC
Barksdale Air Force Base
AFRC
Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth AFRC
Scott Air Force Base
IL ANG
Whiteman Air Force Base
AFRC
Davis–Monthan Air Force Base
AFRC
March Joint Air Reserve Base
AFRC
Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam
HI ANG

Assoc

ACC
AMC
AFGSC
ACC
AMC
ACC
ACC
AMC
PACAF

Figure 7 – Authoritative Complexities of Selected TFAs

Within each of these chosen bases two individuals were identified as the target interview
population: a senior tactical level ANG or AFR maintenance authority (e.g. Squadron
Commander, Superintendent, or Maintenance Operations Officer) and, dependent on the local
construct, his closest AD counterpart. Due to the diversity of local TFA maintenance
organizational setups, this range of acceptable interviewee participation gave the study necessary
flexibility while preserving a standardized, transparent methodology.
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Much of the information regarding Total Force implementation benefits and challenges
reside with those personnel who currently have or have had hands-on experience in associated
organizations. Thus, the objects or target population of the study include the above identified
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) since they currently serve within and, in the majority of cases,
have previously served in Total Force constructs. In-person interviews would, of course, be the
preferred approach to collect data from these SMEs, but due to the limitations of both time and
cost, all interviews were conducted in an impersonal, semi-structured manner via telephone and
computer communication.
Interviews are pertinent and advantageous for this method of study because much of the
desired data takes the form of “people’s beliefs and perspectives about facts”, “feelings”,
“standards for behavior (i.e., what people think should be done in certain situations)”, and
“conscious reasons for actions or feelings (e.g., why people think that engaging in a particular
behavior is desirable or undesirable)” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The researcher can thus, with
the interview methodology, tailor the interview questions in such a way to access this wealth and
diversity of perspectives and harness them as a source of credible data.
Semi-Structured Interview Method Benefits
A number of benefits accompany administering a semi-structured interview to this
particular research (Creswell, 2014):
•

Opportunity for Feedback – The interviewer can provide direct feedback to the
respondent, give clarifications, and help alleviate any misconceptions or apprehensions
(e.g. confidentiality) the respondent may have in answering the interviewer’s questions.
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•

Probing Complex Answers – The interviewer can probe if the respondent’s answer is too
brief or unclear. This option gives the interviewer flexibility in dealing with unstructured
questions and is especially suited for handling complex questions.

•

Length of Interview – If the questionnaire is deemed lengthy, the more personal nature of
an interview is the best technique for getting respondents to cooperate, without
overtaxing their patience.

•

Complete Questionnaires – This method is the best way to ensure that the respondent will
answer all questions asked.

•

High Participation – Interviewing respondents personally increases the likelihood of
participation, as many people prefer to communicate directly, verbally, and sharing
information and insights with interviewers.
Impersonal Interview Method Challenges
Despite the heightened advantages, none of the interviews were administered by the

researcher in person thereby introducing some challenges (Creswell, 2014):
•

Necessity for Callbacks – When a person selected for interview cannot be reached the
first time, a callback has to be scheduled which results in extra cost and time spent.

•

Personal Style – The interviewer’s individual questioning style, techniques, approach and
demeanor may influence the respondents’ answers. This vulnerability while generally
true of the Interview methodology is arguably heightened by the lack of in-person
interview and respondent interaction.
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Methodology Roadmap
As previously stated, recorded interview audio data was transcribed and analyzed using
appropriate computer software. Ultimately, the interview responses served as the basis for
individually addressing the study’s overarching research and investigative questions. The 16
interview questions available for review in Appendix D were formed with the dual purpose of 1)
providing the respondents with a clear medium for expressing comprehensive Total Force
perspectives as well as 2) providing the researcher a mechanism for teasing out full nuances of
the investigative and research questions. In this way, the respondent’s recorded answers when
appropriately segmented serve as the data source for answering the foundational investigative
questions. In other words, the interview questions function as a framework to pursue desired
topic depth while simultaneously preserving a standardized approach and clarity for both the
respondents and researcher.
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The following Figure 8 gives a visual representation of how each investigative question
fed into the interview questions:

Figure 8 – Connection of Investigative Questions to Interview Questions

All the interview questions were disseminated beforehand to the respondents in an effort
to afford the greatest level of transparency of process, honesty in responses, and forethought in
answers. The average length of each interview was 39 minutes and collectively generated 11
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hours and 23 minutes of audio recordings. These recordings transcribed to a collective 182 pages
of text which, as stated previously, served as the primary data source for the entire study.
Finally, after all the interview responses were segmented using open coding in
accordance with their respective investigative question, the data were axially and selectively
coded to allow for content, sentiment, and descriptive analysis which respectively collect similar
phrases and themes, group topic sentiments and opinions, and summarize stated responses
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). The results of this coding and subsequent analysis provided the means
by which the investigative and research questions were answered as Chapter 4 will demonstrate.

Summary
In summary, a total of 18 SMEs comprising an equal distribution of AD and ARC
personnel from a total of nine TFAs at nine bases across five MAJCOMs leading the efforts in
maintaining over 150 airframes comprising five MDS aircraft were approached to be interviewed
via a semi-structured impersonal interview method. These individuals supplied the data, which
once transcribed, coded, and analyzed, served as the basis for answering the study’s core
research and investigative questions.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Chapter Overview
This chapter reintroduces and subsequently answers the study’s core investigative
questions. The data analyzed in order to answer each of the questions comes from the interviews
conducted by the researcher. The data, in order to preserve respondent anonymity and trust, is
analyzed and discussed at the aggregate level. Ultimately, the answers generated through the data
analysis serve as the means for answering the overarching research question and addressing the
originally presented problem statement.

Investigative Question #1
What, collectively, do leaders understand the Total Force concept to mean at the tactical
level?
The first point of interest emerging from the data is the evident lack of consensus in the
answers given to the interview question. No two answers from respondents share complete
overlap in their definitions. Yet the data reflects two basic response styles: one expressing the
Total Force concept as having an intrinsic, definable identity and the other expressing the Total
Force concept as a means of achieving some benefit(s). The researcher notes, however, a
distinction in the respondents’ understanding of the interview question as some give answers
using the lens of what the Total Force concept was “intended” to do versus what they “observe”
it to do. Recognizing this distinction calls into question the extent to which response conclusions
are valid.
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The majority of responses reflect the former style (i.e. the Total Force concept having an
intrinsic, definable identity) and while the words vary with each respondent they convey the
similar claim that the Total Force concept represents “two different organizations working
seamlessly together as one to achieve the same, assigned mission.”
The latter response style, represented by the minority of respondents, defined the Total
Force concept as a means of achieving the following collective listing of benefits:
•

Reduced costs

•

Increased manpower

•

Increased aircraft utilization

•

Maximization of aircraft availability

•

Increased efficiencies of partnering organizations

•

Additional capabilities provided to combatant commanders

•

Improved training making younger maintainers more efficient

•

Synergistic effects from the combination of AD flexibility and perspective with ARC
knowledge and experience

No single answer of this latter style provides a comprehensive listing of all the benefits.
In fact, the majority of responses of this type provide only one benefit with the final benefit in
this listing receiving the greatest independently repeated affirmation. Yet, this observation does
not necessarily connote that, if provided this comprehensive benefit listing, these same
respondents would dispute them. Additionally, in a greater number of instances than the latter
style, but still not the majority, the respondents give answers expressing some combination of
both styles of answer.
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Investigative Question #2
On which topics, respecting employment of the Total Force concept, do tactical level
Total Force leaders collectively perceive similar benefits as those lauded by the AF’s most
strategic leaders?
Chapter 2’s review of the relevant literature presents 16 benefits that the CSAF and/or
SecAF laud employment of the Total Force concept garnering. In order to answer this
investigative question, therefore, the researcher presented these 16 benefits divested of their
contextual qualifiers to the tactical Total Force leaders in the interview question depicted in the
following Figure 9.

Figure 9 – Total Force Interview Question #2

The collective responses demonstrate no consensus for any of the 16 benefits listed in
Figure 9 with the exceptions of Resource Usage, Duplication of Efforts, and Operational
Effectiveness. With these three exceptions, the consensus reflects a simple majority and no
instances of unanimous respondent opinion. Furthermore, the majority tactical level Total Force
perspective claims an opposite movement with regards to Duplication of Efforts than does the
AF’s most strategic leaders.
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The researcher, similar to the first investigative question, posits a validity caveat with
regards to observations of differing interpretations of the interview question. Examples of these
differences include discussions of an increased need for training versus an increased quality of
training or, in another instance, a decreased ability to mobilize versus a decreased need to
mobilize. This observation arguably limits the response conclusions since these varied responses
to the current form of the interview question drives, through lack of context, the researcher to ask
not a single, standardized question of all respondents; but, instead, multiple questions depending
on the respondent’s respective paradigm.

Investigative Question #3
What unforeseen, symptomatic problems (with discernable root causes) do tactical level
Total Force leaders perceive employment of the Total Force concept introducing?
Two questions within the interview frame the basis for answering this investigative
question:
•

Do you see the Total Force concept introducing any unforeseen, symptomatic
problems?

•

Of these symptomatic problems, what do you see as the root cause(s)?

Of observational note, while answering these two interview questions, respondents
mostly chose this opportunity to voice their support of continued employment of the Total Force
concept. Several respondents, in fact, went further to describe their local TFA partnerships in
very positive terms reflecting on when “communication is good and the units are properly
resourced” few to no symptomatic problems are present. That stated, the majority of respondents
did contribute thoughts and observations for both symptomatic problems and root causes. In
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some instances, one respondent cites the same topic(s) as a symptomatic problem that another
respondent cites as a root cause and vice versa. Additionally, rarely do any of the respondents
express the same pairings of observed symptomatic problems and root causes. Due to the
convoluted nature of assigning terms, therefore, the researcher grouped the various topics into
larger categories demonstrated in the below Figure 10:

Figure 10 – Synthesized List of Identified Symptomatic Problems and Root Causes

The above Figure 10 respectively depicts the full listing of topics respondents observe as
Symptomatic, Mixture (i.e. convoluted application of terms), and Root Cause in three distinct
columns (depicted by Figure 10’s top yellow, orange, and red blocks). Within each column four
subcategories were established thereby grouping the similar concepts together. Since much of the
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data respondents provide for these interview questions is anecdotal in nature, several specific
examples are included as bullets within each subcategory.
While some might critique the particular grouping of certain topics, the respondent
content remains valid rendering the argument largely moot. The bottom line analysis points to a
wide ranging spectrum of topics which hinder the Total Force concept and are, in some
instances, believed to be a result of its employment.

Investigative Question #4
Regarding the listed root causes, do tactical level Total Force leaders believe decision
making and subsequent solution generating to be more appropriately handled by higher
organizational levels?
Teasing out the full intent of this investigative question required the respondents to
answer two interview questions:
•

At your level, are you equipped and able to engage root causes or are you relegated
solely to managing the symptomatic problems?

•

At what organizational level should these root causes be addressed?
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The following Figure 11 depicts the summation of their responses to these two questions:

Figure 11 – Respondent Investigation Question #4 Summation

The majority position of the respondents (depicted by Figure 11’s top left, red block)
consider themselves relegated solely to managing the Total Force symptomatic problems and not
equipped and/or able to engage root causes. This respondent majority lists a number of agencies
(depicted by Figure 11’s gray blocks) above the Wing level at which engagement of root causes
should more properly be addressed. Of these listed higher headquarter agencies, the one most
often voiced as the appropriate agent of change is HAF.
For the respondent minority position in which tactical level Total Force leaders consider
themselves equipped and/or able to go beyond symptomatic problems and engage root causes
(depicted by Figure 11’s top right, green block), the listed appropriate agencies of change
(depicted by Figure 11’s blue blocks) are those at or below the Wing level and ultimately closest
to the issue (i.e. at the lowest level).
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Returning to the investigative question, the majority of the interviewed tactical level
Total Force leaders do believe it more appropriate that the root causes of Total Force
symptomatic problems be engaged at a higher organizational level with specific weight placed
on HAF for this ownership.

Investigative Question #5
In what ways do tactical level Total Force leaders perceive a lack of adequate training,
resources, and/or guidance to address Total Force concerns?
Predominately when addressing Total Force concerns, the respondents believe sufficient
Resources and Guidance currently exists. Of note, in these “adequate” instances, is the fact that
the interview question, presented as it is (i.e. in binary “yes/no” response terms), limits the
degree of further insights possible. For those cases in which the minority of respondents express
a lack of Resources, they do so in two overarching forms: a lack in necessary funding and/or
facilities in the initial stand-up of a TFA and a lack in maintenance manpower, exacerbated in a
TFA setting, due to the stand-up of the F-35 aircraft.
While the barest majority does perceive a lack of adequate Training, differences of
opinion emerge as to what form any additions need take. One school of thought promotes “on the
job” training as the only true and required Total Force teacher while an alternate position
recommends developing some type of formalized, introductory training for those entering a TFA
context for the first time. In both cases, the respondents express a need for the training to reach
above and beyond the Wing level into the MAJCOMs.
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Investigative Question #6
From whom or what entity do tactical level Total Force leaders seek Total Force specific
guidance?
The following Figure 12 depicts the respondents’ ordered listing of Total Force specific
guidance references.

Figure 12 – Referenced Sources of Total Force Specific Guidance

The immediate chain including Total Force SMEs within the unit and up to the Wing
level serve as the primary source of Total Force guidance. Respondents cite this reference source
providing as much as 80 percent of necessary day to day Total Force guidance. AFI 90-1001
mandated Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs),
which codify the respective responsibilities of the TFA partnering components, serve for the
minority of respondents as the next source of Total Force guidance. Interestingly, the majority of
respondents note the MOAs / MOUs specific to their particular TFA are non-existent, in draft, in
rewrite, and/or outdated. A Numbered Air Force (NAF) or MAJCOM followed by AFI 90-1001
take the final two “sparingly” referenced positions. Some respondents do note, however, that the
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AFI does take a more prominent position in the reference line up in the earliest stages of a TFA
standing up.

Investigative Question #7
What is the collective wisdom from tactical level Total Force leaders for sustaining
and/or improving employment of the Total Force concept?
In order to approach answering this investigative question, three separate interview
questions were posed the tactical level Total Force leaders:
•

Describe what perfect integration/association at your unit would look like?

•

Describe what integration/association at your unit currently looks like?

•

What needs to happen to move integration/association at your unit from what it is
now to the desired goal?

Three tactical level recommendations emerge from the analysis of the data as expressed
by the majority of respondents. First, the respondents most prominently express a need and/or
desire for a single, clear chain of command in which the appointed decision makers have
authority over matters currently segmented into distinct ADCON and OPDIR realms.
Maintaining segregation of these areas, they argue, negatively limits and/or impacts many areas
within the organizations such as funding, flexibility, and personnel accountability. Second, the
majority of respondents observe, within their local TFAs, duplicated positions particularly
amongst administrative/supervisory roles. These respondents, therefore, advise TFAs promote
and pursue full functional integration/association at all levels. Third, following in a similar vein
of thought, the majority of respondents advise full locational integration commenting that to do
otherwise dooms the TFA to continued relational tension and strife.
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Four tactical level recommendations also emerge from the analysis of the data not
necessarily repeated by all but finding their voice amongst the respondent minority. First,
respondents recognize an increased relational pressure within TFAs drives a comparable
increased need to openly and clearly communicate amongst partner components. In the words of
one respondent, the TFA context generates an “increased pressure or need to communicate,
while, simultaneously, [generating] an increased vulnerability to communication barriers.”
Second, multiple responses mention needs with regards to manpower. Several of these instances
refer to the drain on manpower due to the draw from standing up the F-35 community. Others
express the general shortage of available skilled aircraft maintainers in general. An interesting
and pertinent observation arose from some respondents with regards to this manpower draw.
These respondents note that percent mixture changes seem to generate a seasonal nature to the
available work pool. In the times immediately following significant decreases to the Total Force
end strength, efforts in finding and hiring skilled labor, specifically in the ARC, exhibit greater
levels of success temporarily. Third, several respondents speak to the need to fully fund the
mandated training requirement. In these instances, harkening back to the first recommendation,
respondents express the challenges of accessing funding from multiple sources or streams of
money (e.g. State vs. Federal). Finally, some respondents posit the need to choose either a
Classic or Active TFA, and not place both at a single base. “By having both,” one respondent
argues, “you cancel out the benefits of both of those programs [essentially trading] active duty
bodies for reserve bodies [making] those active duty bodies less useful, and [trading] active duty
bodies with reserve bodies that [in turn become] less useful.” The end result produces “two
organizations less efficient, instead of just making one organization less efficient.”
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The following Figure 13 gives a visual depiction of this collective wisdom from the
tactical level Total Force leaders with regards to sustaining and/or improving the Total Force
concept.

Figure 13 – Collective Recommendations for Sustaining and/or Improving the TFC

The reader must bear in mind that the above Figure 13 reflects the collective wisdom of
the independently interviewed tactical level Total Force leaders and not a comprehensive listing
of all the ways the Total Force concept might be sustained and/or improved. While they all might
agree with the collective recommendations, no single respondent individually promoted or
provided the entire list. This list, however, does garner greater credibility by observing the
obvious overlap between it and the AF doctrine published within its Aircraft Maintenance
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) 3.3, Table 15.3 Total Force Integration “Best
Practices” encouraging the following behavior excerpts:
•

Fully integrate personnel at all levels.
61

•

Positive/Cordial relationships are key to a successful TFI partnership. Realize and
understand the role personalities, unit identity, conflict and culture play in the
creation/sustainment of a successful, functionally integrated organization.

•

Place personnel of associate units in positions of like rank and responsibility.

•

Request fiscal year MPA needs and funding by June of the previous year.

•

Consider per diem and travel needs for TR/TG/DSG as part of the funding.

•

Integrate associate unit personnel in deployment planning; and utilize them to support
AEF rotations.

•

Quickly notify associate unit of individual taskings to best utilize volunteerism.

•

Active and consistent lines of communication are hallmark to successful TFI units.

Summary
Ultimately, by reintroducing the study’s core investigative questions, this chapter
explores the synthesis of analyzed data in order to, then, answer those same questions. The data
analyzed to answer each question comes from the interviews conducted by the researcher. The
data analysis, discussed in this chapter at the aggregate level, provides, in the subsequent and
final chapter, the necessary insights for answering the overarching research question and
addressing the originally presented, problem statement.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the research’s aggregated findings and final conclusions as well as
the recommendations for action and future research. The conclusions and recommendations for
action find their basis in the analysis, the answering of the investigative questions, and culminate
in the answering of the overarching research question. The recommendations for future research
stem from the manifestation, throughout the course of the study, of certain important questions
which fall outside of the originally defined research scope.
Discussion
Aggregating the responses to the investigative questions result in a number of findings
regarding the collective and majority perspectives of the tactical level Total Force leaders.
First, there appears to be great variance in the leaders’ summations of the Total Force
concept. While these summations can be grouped into two basic types, the lack of consensus
emerges as the central conclusive feature with no one respondent answer completely matching
another. This observation implies an absence of a clear Total Force concept vision and objective.
Second, collectively, tactical level Total Force leaders greatly differ from the AF’s most
strategic leaders in their appreciation of the previously identified 16 Total Force benefits. Again,
the lack of consensus amongst the tactical leaders, as to the unit level effects of employing the
Total Force concept, materializes as the most significant observation. This lack of consensus
points to an absence of clear tools for measuring the effectiveness of the TFA at the tactical
level.
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Third, tactical level Total Force leaders identify, at least, eight categories of symptomatic
problems tied with varying root causes resultant from employment of the TFA construct. The
degree of readily evident challenges does not categorically drive the conclusion that the TFA
construct is intrinsically flawed; but, rather, highlights the plethora of opportunities tactical level
Total Force leaders identify as areas for improvement. This finding, though, does afford a greater
level of concern when juxtaposed with the subsequent findings stemming from the tactical level
Total Force leaders’ majority opinions.
Leaders, from the majority perspective, believe themselves relegated solely to managing
symptomatic problems. These leaders, even when they are properly equipped, consider the root
causes more appropriately addressed at levels above the Wing. In most cases, then, this
observation connected with the previous finding points to a community of leaders able to identify
but ill equipped to solve the challenges manifesting in their local TFAs. Despite this perceived
powerlessness to affect lasting changes or fundamental improvements to the Total Force concept,
the majority of tactical level Total Force leaders advocate for the TFA construct and promote its
continued employment and success.
Finally, the majority of leaders in the Total Force community do claim an adequate
amount of guidance and resources to address Total Force concerns. These leaders largely seek
their guidance from within their immediate chain. Mostly they do this to address challenges at
the lowest feasible level; but, often, they seek guidance at lower levels because they confront
recurring frustrations in a lack of empathy and engagement from any level above the Wing.
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Conclusions of Research
Reflection back to Chapter 1’s stated research implications provides the framework for
introducing the final conclusions. The first of the three implications, is the provision of an
assessment of the tactical level’s “perceived” local TFA health. The findings of this research
drive the conclusion of a “mixed bag” with regards to this perception. On the one hand, many
respondents express clear, unadulterated support for continued employment of the Total Force
concept. These respondents state that things continue well within their local TFAs and that
communication is good and relationships strong. Yet, conversely, the collective attempts of the
respondents to define the Total Force concept are completely disparate. Furthermore, the
respondents generate no consensus regarding the effects of the lauded benefits which supposedly
signal the successful employment of the Total Force concept. In other words, multiple TFAs
“perceive” themselves as healthy but only have the subjective nature of the current relationship
as the prevailing method for making this assessment.
With no measuring stick for evaluating the effectiveness of a TFA and no collective
tactical level appreciation of its benefits, the AF postures to repeat the challenges of the past. The
Comptroller General reported to Congress in 1979 that the DoD “should issue comprehensive
guidance for a uniform total force policy and for effectively measuring its benefits” (Staats,
1979). Yet, despite over 35 years of Total Force maturation, this call remains unanswered.
Additionally, with the majority of tactical level leaders believing themselves relegated solely to
managing symptomatic problems and not equipped to engage the root causes, their vocal
advocating on behalf of the TFA construct and promotion of its continued success bears
remarkable similarity to the events surrounding SecDef Schlesinger in 1973. As previously
mentioned, SecDef Schlesinger, claiming that the “Total Force is no longer a ‘concept’ [but] is
65

now the Total Force Policy” (Correll, 2011) and then witnessing the discarding of the TFP draft
in the same year as its inception, voiced an “expression of support rather than a change of
substance” (RAND, 1993)(Correll, 2011).
Without strategic leaders providing a clear objective for the Total Force concept, they
sacrifice tactical clarity for tactical diversity; and, at best, they hinder its developmental success
and, at worst, they guarantee its failure. Political and monetary ties within this complex context
arguably drive much of their strategic choices. Yet, vague strategic policy, when viewed through
the lens of the previously discussed Force Field Theory, increases the obstacles to change by
preventing what should be Driving Forces (i.e. tactical level Total Force leaders) from knowing
uniformly where they should go. By way of analogy, astronauts taking turns piloting a space ship
will eventually get somewhere; but will likely miss the moon, regardless of each helmsman’s
skill and finesse, unless they recognize the moon as the intended target. Even then, they will still
require significant, external levels of support along the way.

Research Question Answered
What success factors are needed to allow tactical level Total Force leaders to share a
common objective and means of evaluating the Total Force Active Association?
In light of the aggregated findings to the investigative questions and the subsequent
research conclusions, four success factors emerge as necessary for allowing tactical level Total
Force leaders to share a common objective and means of evaluating the Total Force Active
Association. The first success factor requires clear HAF direction defining and driving the Unity
of Effort for the Total Force concept. Such action requires removal of what this research reveals
as communication and perception disconnects between the strategic and tactical levels (i.e.
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second research implication). The second success factor requires the removal of current State and
Federal legal barriers. Without the means to feasibly and legally align agendas, State and
Federal partners will inevitably struggle with one another and their objectives remain disparate.
The third success factor requires the strengthening of the support ties between the local TFA and
its governing higher headquarter entities. The majority of respondents recognize these higher
headquarter entities as the appropriate agents for affecting lasting change to the root causes of
Total Force symptomatic problems. Therefore, without these agencies involvement, definitions
of the objective and selections for the means of evaluation will remain non-standard,
decentralized, and subjective in nature. The fourth success factor requires time. When dealing
with organizations as large as the ARC and AD component with their differing cultures and
differing agendas in an authoritatively complex setting, it would be naïve to expect an immediate
shift in their character, nature, and/or direction.

Recommendations for Action
Echoing the call of the 1979 Comptroller General’s report to Congress, the researcher
recommends standardizing the Total Force concept governing approach. This recommendation
requires the codifying of the TFA objective and the answering of whether the strategy is intended
to be a permanent. On the heels of defining this objective for the TFA should be the development
of a measurement system for evaluating each TFA’s effectiveness in their efforts to reach the
now defined target. The researcher recommends the continued promotion of the I-Wing since its
recent introduction represents a positive step toward enhancing functional integration at all
organizational levels as well as a strengthening of the empathetic ties of agencies above the
tactical level. As an additional step beyond this effort, though, the researcher recommends
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empowering, incentivizing, and requiring both the NAFs and MAJCOMs to better understand
and champion Wing level TFA obstacles.

Recommendations for Future Research
Throughout the course of this research a number of questions emerge which fall outside
of the initially defined research scope. These five areas are recommended as future topics:
•

Has the ARC shifted from its traditional role as a strategic reserve and can it truly
provide a surge capacity as defined by AF Doctrine within the aircraft maintenance
community?

•

Do Classic and Active Associations conducting maintenance at the same base
diminish or cancel one another’s integration benefits by their proximity?

•

What influence have State unions had on the AF’s ability to generate airpower?

•

Has the integration State and Federal funds decreased, shifted, or disguised the
monetary cost burden of aircraft maintenance?

•

What benefits versus challenges are produced by the relatively recent introduction of
full time uniform wear for the Dual Status ANG Technician?

Summary
Optimizing the employment of the Total Force concept requires more than a cursory
understanding of the subject matter. Much of this understanding must be gained through
harnessing experience and improving the relationships formed in TFAs. Strategic leaders must
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understand the challenges of the past to promote effective visions for the future. Before claiming
success the AF must first define its objective for TFAs and develop a means for periodically
evaluating their performance. By taking these steps and continually finding ways to access the
tactical level perspectives and lessons learned, the obstacles can and will be overcome by the
greater driving forces of a Unity of Effort realized.

- THE END -
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Appendix A: Air Force Total Force Associations
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Appendix B: Selected Total Force Associations
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Appendix C: Impacted Total Force Associations
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Appendix D: Total Force Interview Questions
1. What do you understand the “Total Force concept” to mean for your unit?
2. Of the following list, has your unit experienced Increased, Decreased, or No Change in
behavior due to the employment of the Total Force concept? Can you elaborate?
• Resource Usage
• Personnel Stability
• Military Capability
• Duplication of Efforts
• Balance of Experience
• Leadership Development
• Operational Effectiveness
• Other Synergistic Effects

• Training
• Capacity
• Retention
• Readiness
• Efficiency
• Flexibility
• Mobilization
• Cost Savings

3. Do you see the Total Force concept introducing any unforeseen, symptomatic
problems?
4. Of these symptomatic problems, what do you see as the root cause(s)?
5. At your level, are you equipped and able to engage root causes or are you
relegated solely to managing the symptomatic problems?
6. At what organizational level should these root causes be addressed?
7. Regardless of whether symptomatic or a root cause, are you equipped with
adequate training to address Total Force concerns?
8. Regardless of whether symptomatic or a root cause, are you equipped with
adequate resources to address Total Force concerns?
9. Regardless of whether symptomatic or a root cause, are you equipped with
adequate guidance to address Total Force concerns?
10. From whom or what entity do you look for Total Force specific guidance?
11. How often do you refer to the following guidance:
• AFI 90-1001: Responsibilities For Total Force Integration
• AFGM 2016-01: Interim Guidance to AFI 90-1001
• Commander’s Integration Guide
• Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) / Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA)
12. What differences of opinion arise concerning topics falling under the purview of
Operational Direction (OPDIR) versus Administrative Control (ADCON)?
i.
At what level are such differences resolved?
13. Describe what perfect integration/association at your unit would look like?
14. Describe what integration/association at your unit currently looks like?
15. What needs to happen to move integration/association at your unit from what it is
now to the desired goal?
16. Do you have additional/other Total Force thoughts/comments not fully covered
through these questions?
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Appendix E: Acronyms
AD – Active Duty

NCSAF – National Commission on the

ADCON – Administrative Control

Structure of the Air Force

AF – Air Force

NDAA – National Defense

AFB – Air Force Base

Authorization Act

AFGM – Air Force Guidance

NAF – Numbered Air Force

Memorandum

OPCON – Operational Control

AFI – Air Force Instruction

OPDIR – Operational Direction

AFPD – Air Force Policy Directive

POTUS – President of the United States

AFPM – Air Force Policy Memorandum

RegAF – Regular Air Force

AFR – Air Force Reserve

SecDef – Secretary of Defense

ANG – Air National Guard

SME – Subject Matter Expert

ARC – Air Reserve Component

TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and

CJCS – Chairman of the Joint Chief of

Procedures

Staff

TFA – Total Force Association

CSAF – Chief of Staff of the Air Force

TFC – Total Force Concept

DoD – Department of Defense

TFI – Total Force Integration

FTF – Future Total Force

TFIA – Total Force Integration

HAF – Headquarters Air Force

Association

MAJCOM – Major Command

TFP – Total Force Policy

MOA – Memorandum of Agreement

UMD – Unit Manning Document

MOU – Memorandum of Understanding

USAF – United States Air Force

MDS – Mission Design Series

USC – United States Code
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Appendix F: Consent to Participate Questionnaire
An Investigation into the Indicators of a Successful Total Force Association
You have been asked to participate in a study conducted by researchers from the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT), Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Department
of Operational Sciences. The main objective of this project is to explore the experience and
perspectives of unit leaders currently serving in Total Force Active Associations across the Air
Force (AF). This effort stems from a desire to better enable the Total Force Continuum (TF-C) in
understanding unit-level observed stress points of Total Force integrative efforts. You were
selected as a participant in this study because of your leadership role within a Total Force Active
Association. You should read the information below and ask questions about anything you do not
understand before deciding whether or not to participate.
-

This interview is voluntary. You have the right to decline answering any question. I
expect the interview will take approximately 60 minutes.

-

You will not be compensated for this interview.

-

The information you tell us will be kept confidential. All data will be presented at an
aggregate level.

-

I would like to record this interview so I can transcribe it and use it for analysis as part of
this study. I will not record this interview without your permission. If you grant
permission for this conversation to be recorded, you have the right to revoke permission
and/or end the interview at any time.

-

This project will be completed by May 2017. All interview documents will be stored in a
secure work space until one year after that date. The documents will then be destroyed.

I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
(Please initial)
[

] I give permission for this interview to be recorded and transcribed.

Name of Subject: ________________________________________
Signature of Subject: _____________________________________ Date: ____________
Signature of Investigator: __________________________________Date: ____________

Please contact Maj Hazen with any questions or concerns at benjamin.hazen@afit.edu or 937255-3636 x4337.
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Appendix G: Investigation Review Board Exemption Letter
MEMORANDUM FOR AFIT IRB Reviewer

30 September 2016

FROM: AFIT/ENS
2950 Hobson Way
Wright Patterson AFB OH 45433‐7765
SUBJECT: Request for exemption from human experimentation requirements (32 CFR 219,
DoDD 3216.2 and AFI 40-402) for a study for AFIT Thesis Research Study
1. The objective of this study is to more fully understand and define the perceptions of the Active
Duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard Aircraft Maintenance (21A) officers regarding
the Total Force concept and integration/associative efforts. Unit leaders from the three Total
Force components will be interviewed as a part of this study regarding their experience and
perspectives serving in their respective leadership positions within current Total Force Active
Associations. The research project is designed as partial fulfillment of the Logistics and Supply
Chain Management program.
2. This request is based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101,
paragraph (b) (2) Research activities that involve the use of educational tests (cognitive,
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of
public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects
can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) Any disclosure of
the human subjects’ responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or
reputation.
3. Methodology to mitigate personal identifiers/demographic information.
a) The data collected from the in-person interviews and phone interviews will also be stored
in a password protected database. Any reference to the information collected from the
subjects in any published document will exclude personal identifiers.
b) I understand that the names and associated data I collect must be protected at all times,
only be known to the researcher, and managed according to the AFIT interview protocol.
All interview data will only be handled by the following researchers: Maj Ben Hazen and
Capt Greg Hoyt. At the conclusion of the study, all data will be retained and protected by
the principal investigator (Maj Ben Hazen).
4. The following information is provided to show cause for such an exemption:
a) Equipment and facilities: Interviews will be conducted in the subjects’ office or work
location in-person or over the phone. A researcher will use an audio recording device to
record the interviews and a laptop computer or notebook to take notes during each
interview. The web based survey requires no facilities or equipment.
b) Subjects: Individuals chosen to be interviewed and surveyed will be between the rank of
Capt – Col within the 21A communities. It will include individuals from multiple levels
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of leadership (group, squadron, unit). A minimum of 15 people will be selected from the
career field for interviews in order to gain insight from multiple perspectives. A webbased survey will be sent to all personnel within the career fields after AFPC approves it.
i.

ii.
iii.

Source of subjects: Active Duty, Air National Guard, or Air Force Reserve
squadron and/or group commanders with ranks of Capt – Col with core Air Force
Specialty Codes of 21A.
Total number of subjects: Maximum of 20 personnel for the interviews
Inclusion criteria: None

c) Timeframe: Interviews will be accomplished during the months of October and
November 2016.
d) Data collected:
i.

Interview: Individual name, work organization, experience and responses to
interview questions (Attachment 3). The data requested will be based on
opinions/evaluations of the respondents’ experience and perspectives serving in a
Total Force integrated unit. No personal information will be collected or used.
Only the results of the interviews will be used to characterize the current
retention intents of the respondents and opinions on how their career fields could
be managed differently to affect their intentions.

e) Risks to Subjects: Minimal. Any disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside of
the research will not place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging
to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation.
f) Informed consent: All subjects are self-selected to volunteer to participate in the
interview. No adverse action is taken against those who choose not to participate.
Subjects are made aware of the nature and purpose of the research, sponsors of the
research, and disposition of the survey results. For the interview, this will be
communicated to the subjects in a consent form, which will require their signature
(Attachment 4).
5. If you have any questions about this request, please contact Maj Benjamin Hazen (principal
investigator) – Phone 785-3636, ext. 4337; E-mail – benjamin.hazen@afit.edu.

BENJAMIN T. HAZEN, Maj, USAF
Principal Investigator
Attachments:
1) CITI Completion Certificate
2) Researcher CV
3) Total Force Interview Questions
4) Research Topic Description & Interview Consent Form
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Appendix H: Summary Slide
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